

Message Text

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-----181431Z 131037 /40

O R 181210Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3353
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL SONGKHLA
AMCONSUL UDORN
USMISSION GENEVA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BANGKOK 13346

AID/W FOR ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA JOHN H. SULLIVAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF
SUBJECT: INDOCHINESE REFUGEES - RESETTLEMENT IN THAILAND

REF: (A) BANGKOK 9846 (NOTAL), (B) BANGKOK 13225,
(C) STATE 133673

1. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MOI UNDER-SECRETARY
IN CHARGE OF REFUGEE AFFAIRS PRIOR TO OPENING OF RTG/UNHCR
TALKS ON RENEGOTIATION OF REFUGEE AGREEMENT. UNDER-
SECRETARY WAS POSITIVE ON THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL RESETTLEMENT
AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR THE MORE THAN 80,000 REFUGEES IN
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THAILAND. THE RTG CONTINUES TO VIEW WITH APPREHENSION POLITICAL
AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF RESETTLEMENT AS WELL AS CONTINUED
INFLUX OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. EMBASSY ESTIMATES THAT
THE CURRENT CAMP POPULATION AT MORE THAN 79,000 WITH
AN ADDITIONAL OUT-OF-CAMP REFUGEE POPULATION OF 10,000-
15,000. THE INFLOW CONTINUES TO OUTPACE THE OUTFLOW.
WITHOUT A VIABLE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM, THE FUTURE IS

POOR FOR THE REFUGEES. END SUMMARY.

2. MOI UNDER-SECRETARY DAMRONG SUNTHORNSARATOON INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL JUNE 15 THAT RTG WAS GRAVELY CONCERNED WITH FINDING A MEANS OF SLOWING DOWN THE INFLUX OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME OBSERVING HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES. THE RTG WAS ANXIOUS, DAMRONG SAID DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNHCR, TO ESTABLISH A PRINCIPLE THAT THE ONLY REFUGEES WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN REFUGE IN THAILAND IN THE FUTURE ARE GENUINE POLITICAL ESCAPEES AND NOT ECONOMIC MIGRANTS. DAMRONG CONTINUED ON TO SAY THAT THE RTG WILL TREAT ALL REFUGEES WHO ENTER THE KINGDOM AS ILLEGAL ENTRANTS AFTER A CUTOFF DATE TO BE ANNOUNCED. THE RTG, HE SAID, WILL NOW DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THOSE ALREADY IN THAILAND AND NEWCOMERS. DAMRONG, SPEAKING ABOUT THE OBVIOUS NEED FOR SOME RESETTLEMENT SCHEME, REITERATED HIS FEAR AND THAT OF THE RTG, THAT THE FUTURE INFLUX COULD BE TRIPLE THE CURRENT RATE WITH LITTLE RELIEF IN TERMS OF THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT. DAMRONG ELABORATED ON THE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THAILAND IN HAVING SUCH MASSIVE NUMBERS OF ALIENS ON THAI SOIL.

3. COMMENT. THE UNDER-SECRETARY SPOKE, WITHOUT PRODDING, RELATIVELY POSITIVELY ON THE ISSUE OF RESETTLEMENT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE RTG HAVE GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE NEED FOR RESETTLEMENT. ASIDE FROM MINISTER OF INTERIOR SAMAK'S COMMENT TO DEPUTY
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OAKLEY (STATE 133132 (NOTAL)) ABOUT RESETTLING REFUGEES IN BORDER AREAS, WE HAVE PICKED UP SIMILAR SIGNALS. FOR EXAMPLE, A REFUGEE TOLD EMBASSY'S REFUGEE OFFICER THAT THE GOVERNOR OF NONGKHAI HAD PROPOSED TO REFUGEES IN THE NONGKHAI CAMP THAT THEY BE RESETTLED IN PHONEPHISAI DISTRICT OF NONGKHAI PROVINCE, 50 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NONGKHAI TOWN IN A SENSITIVE AREA OF THE THAI/LAO BORDER. FROM THESE AND OTHER STRAWS IN THE WIND, IT APPEARS THAT CURRENT RTG THINKING RELATES TO SETTLING SOME REFUGEES IN BORDER AREAS AS A TRIP WIRE TO INFILTRATORS. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM DAMRONG'S COMMENTS ABOUT A "CUTOFF" DATE AND DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE PRESENT REFUGEE POPULATION AND "NEWCOMERS" THAT A LEGAL BASIS IS BEING LAID TO PERMIT THE RTG TO PUBLICLY SAY THAT IT WILL REFUSE ENTRY TO ECONOMIC REFUGEES. THIS POINT MAY BE CLARIFIED WHEN THE RTG/UNHCR AGREEMENT NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IS PUBLISHED LATER. IT IS NONETHELESS CLEAR THAT THE RTG BELIEVES THAT UNTIMELY OR ILL THOUGHT OUT STATEMENTS ON REFUGEE

RESETTLEMENT COULD BE VERY EMBARRASSING IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT. AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT THE USG WAS VERY COGNIZANT OF THAILAND'S PROBLEM AND WOULD, NO DOUBT, BE SYMPATHETIC TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FOR RESETTLEMENT. TO PERMIT PLANNING, HOWEVER, SOME DEGREE OF COMMITMENT BY THE RTG ON THE ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE RTG WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE CAREFUL IN AVOIDING FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF INDOCHINESE COMING ACROSS THAILAND'S BORDERS. DAMRONG SEEMED SENSITIVE TO THIS POINT AND QUICKLY CONCURRED. END COMMENT.

4. THE CURRENT REFUGEE SITUATION IN THAILAND.

I. REFUGEE AND CAMPT POPULATION: THERE ARE PRESENTLY 15 REFUGEE CAMPS IN THAILAND HOUSING APPROXIMATELY 80,000 REFUGEES CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF 45,000 HMONG (.39), 20,000 LOWLAND LAO, 10,500 KHMER AND 3,300 VIETNAMESE. WE
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ESTIMATE THE OUT-OF-CAMP REFUGEE POPULATION TO NUMBER 10,000-15,000. THIS POPULATION CONSISTS OF FIRST, AN ESTIMATED 2,000 REFUGEES WHO AT ANY GIVEN TIME ARE IN LOCAL DETENTION CENTERS AWAITING PROCESSING INTO AN OFFICIAL REFUGEE CAMP. SECOND, IT EMBRACES AN ESTIMATED 10-15 PERCENT OF REFUGEES WHO ELUDE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND RESIDE IN BORDER AREA WITH FAMILIES AND FRIENDS.

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /086 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3354

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY PARIS
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5. THE TOTAL CAMP POPULATION HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS BECAUSE THE NUMBER OF NEW REFUGEES ENTERING THE CAMPS, WHICH WE ESTIMATE AT 20,000 APPROXIMATELY EQUALLED THE NUMBER OF THOSE DEPARTING THE CAMPS FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THIRD COUNTRIES, PRINCIPALLY THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE.

6. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THE CAMP POPULATION TO GRADUALLY INCREASE DURING THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS BECAUSE THE THIRD COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM WILL FAIL TO KEEP ABREAST OF THE NUMBER OF NEW AND INCREASING NUMBERS OF REFUGEES. WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 1,500-2,000 REFUGEES NOW ENTERING THAILAND EACH MONTH FROM LAOS, CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM. ABOUT 1,000 REFUGEES
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ARE DEPARTING THE CAMPS MONTHLY FOR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT ABROAD. ALMOST ALL OF THEM ARE GOING TO FRANCE SINCE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE RESETTLEMENT EFFORT HAS DECLINED DRASTICALLY WITH THE FINAL COMPLETION OF THE EPP PROGRAM IN DECEMBER 1976.

7. II. CAMP CONDITIONS: GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS APPEAR TO BE SATISFACTORY WITH SOME NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, PRINCIPALLY, THE HMONG (MEO) CAMP AT NAM YAO IN NAN PROVINCE IN THE NORTH AND THE VIETNAMESE CAMP IN SONGKHLA PROVINCE IN THE SOUTH. IN BOTH OF THESE LOCATIONS THE COMBINATION OF STRONG, LOCAL ETHNIC ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE HMONG AND VIETNAMESE AND POOR LIVING CONDITIONS RESULTS IN REAL HARDSHIPS FOR THE REFUGEES. HOWEVER, IN ALL THE OTHER CAMPS THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI), SUPPORTED BY THE UNHCR AND THE VOLAGS, SEEMS TO BE DOING AN EFFECTIVE JOB OF PROVIDING THE REFUGEES WITH ADEQUATE FOOD, HOUSING, WATER, MEDICAL SERVICES AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES. THE VOLAGS ARE MAKING A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THROUGH THEIR SUPPORT OF MEDICAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SELF-HELP PROGRAMS. THAI AUTHORITIES PERMIT THE REFUGEES IN MOST CAMPS TO LEAVE THE CAMPS IN LIMITED NUMBERS ON DAILY

EXCURSIONS TO VISIT THE MARKET, CASH CHECKS AND EVEN TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, USUALLY AS LABORERS. CAMP OFFICIALS ALSO SEEM TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES WIDE LATITUDE TO ADMINISTER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS THROUGH THEIR OWN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT. A MAJOR PROBLEM FACING ALL THE CAMPS IS THE ENFORCED IDLENESS OF MOST OF THE ADULT POPULATION. THE LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE THINGS TO DO CONSIDERABLY SAPS REFUGEE MORALE. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, DESPITE THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CAMP LIFE AND THE OCCASIONAL HARDSHIPS, THE MORALE OF THE MAJORITY OF REFUGEES APPEARS TO BE REASONABLY GOOD.

8. III. LOCAL ATTITUDE REGARDING THE REFUGEE CAMPS:
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THE ATTITUDE OF THE LOCAL POPULATION TOWARDS THE REFUGEES VARIES. THE LOCAL POPULACE DISPLAY A STRONG CULTURAL AND ETHNIC DISLIKE FOR THE HMONG (MEO) AND VIETNAMESE. IN CONTRAST, PEOPLE IN THE VICINITY OF THE LOWLAND LAO AND KHMER CAMPS TEND TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES WITH WHOM THEY SHARE STRONG CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC BACKGROUNDS. AT THE SAME TIME, LOCAL INHABITANTS RESENT ANY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PROVIDE BENEFITS TO THE REFUGEES, REGARDLESS OF THEIR ETHNIC MAKEUP, THAT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THEM.

9. THE ATTITUDES FOR SENIOR LOCAL THAI OFFICIALS TOWARDS THE REFUGEES REFLECT THE SAME CULTURAL AND ETHNIC PREJUDICES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION. IN ADDITION, LOCAL OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, ARE HIGHLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTHEAST. THEY FEAR, THAT THE NEIGHBORING COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE EXPLOITING THE REFUGEE INFLUX TO INFILTRATE SPIES AND SABOTEURS INTO THAILAND TO PROVIDE ADDED SUPPORT TO THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY. WHILE THEIR FEARS APPEAR GREATLY EXAGGERATED TO AN OUTSIDER, THEIR UNEASE OVER THIS POINT IS SUBSTANTIAL AND SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY CONSIDERATION OF THEIR POSSIBLE COOPERATION WITH AN IN-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM.

10. IV. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THAILAND: WE SUGGEST THAT ANY SCHEME TO PERMANENTLY RESETTLE REFUGEES IN THAILAND SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL FACTORS:
-- ETHNIC MAKEUP OF THE REFUGEE POPULATION. IN THIS REGARD WE WOULD NOTE THE STRONG, ALMOST UNIVERSAL THAI DISLIKE OF VIETNAMESE WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO

SUCCESSFULLY RESETTLE THEM IN THAILAND. THE ANIMOSITY
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O R 181210Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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TOWARDS THE HMONG (MEO) IS LESS STRONG BUT IS STILL A
CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLE TO SUCCESSFUL RESETTLEMENT. IT
COULD BE PERHAPS PARTIALLY OVERCOME BY RESETTLING THE
HMONGS IN REMOTE AREA FAR FROM CONTACT WITH LOWLAND
THAI. HOWEVER, THE HMONG WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE
PERSUADED TO MODIFY THEIR TRADITIONAL SLASH AND BURN
AGRICULTURAL METHODS TO PRACTICES MORE SUITABLE FOR
THAILAND, MUCH OF WHOSE FORESTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
RAVAGED BY UNSCRUPULOUS LUMBERING METHODS.
-- ECONOMIC/SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE REFUGEES. OUR
ANALYSIS OF THE CAMP POPULATION IS THAT MANY OF THE
REFUGEES COME FROM URBAN OR NON-FARM BACKGROUNDS WHICH

MAKES IT DOUBTFUL THAT THEY COULD PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY
IN A RURAL RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ESTIMATE
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THAT TWO THIRDS OF THE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 LOWLAND LAO
INHABITANTS OF THE NONGKHAI REFUGEE CAMPS ARE URBAN
DWELLERS AND OFFICE WORKERS FROM THE VIENTIANE PLAIN
AREA. WE WOULD GUESS THAT ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE 6,700
LOWLAND LAO REFUGEES IN THE UBON CAMP AND A SIMILAR
PERCENTAGE OF THE 3,700 CAMBODIAN IN THE SURIN CAMP HAVE
THE SAME TYPE OF BACKGROUND.

-- ATTITUDES OF THE LOCAL THAI POPULATION. WE WOULD
SUGGEST HERE THAT ANY RESETTLEMENT EFFORT BE MADE PART
OF GENERAL RURAL OR URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT THAT
WILL MEAN SUBSTANTIAL, CONCRETE BENEFITS FOR THE LOCAL
THAI POPULACE.

-- AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE RESETTLEMENT SITES. WE
THINK THE KEY FACTORS TO KEEP IN MIND ARE, (A) ATTEMPT
TO INFLUENCE THE RTG TO RESETTLE REFUGEES IN THE INTERIOR
OF THE COUNTRY RATHER THAN IN BORDER AREAS WHICH WILL
ONLY PERPETUATE MANY OF THE PROBLEMS NOW ASSOCIATED WITH
THE REFUGEE CAMPS, AND (B) CONDUCT CAREFUL FEASIBILITY
STUDIES TO LOCATE SITES WHERE THE REFUGEES CAN BE
REASONABLY EXPECTED TO SURVIVE ECONOMICALLY, EVENTUALLY
ON THEIR OWN.

-- CONCERN OF THAI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS. WE
SUGGEST THAT AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO INCLUDE SENIOR THAI
MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF GOVERNORS IN THE PROVINCE WHERE THE CAMPS ARE
LOCATED, AT THE OUTSET OF DISCUSSION OF RESETTLEMENT
PLANS. THE ENDORSEMENT OF MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS
MUST BE OBTAINED IF A RESETTLEMENT SCHEME IS TO SUCCEED,
THE BACKING OF THE MOI CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY NOTWITH-
STANDING.

-- USG ROLE IN RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS. USG SHOULD EX-
PECT TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS THROUGH UNHCR
TO ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE
RESETTLEMENT/DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

-- PART OF THEIR FUNDING SHOULD ALSO BE USED TO
FINANCE THE ACTIVITIES OF VOLAGS WHO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN
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SUPPLEMENTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNHCR.

-- USG SHOULD PLEDGE TO ARRANGE FOR THE RESETTLEMENT
IN THE U.S. OR OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES OF ALL VIETNAMESE
REFUGEES AS WELL AS THOSE HMONG (MEO), LOWLAND LAO AND

CAMBODIAN REFUGEES WHO WOULD HAVE QUALIFIED FOR ADMISSION INTO THE U.S. UNDER THE FORMER EXPANDED PAROLE PROGRAM (EPP) IN CATEGORY I, II, OR III PAROLEES. WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 13,500 SUCH REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN THAILAND TODAY. (A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF THEIR TOTAL, BY ETHNIC GROUP, IS PROVIDED AT THE END OF THIS TELEGRAM.) WE WOULD LIKE TO CALL PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE ESTIMATED 4,500 CATEGORY II AND III PAROLEES WHOSE PLIGHT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED IN THE EMPHASIS ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION THAT CHARACTERIZES OUR PAROLEE ADMISSION PROCEDURES. WE BELIEVE THAT USG AGREEMENT TO RESETTLE A FAIR SHARE OF POTENTIAL CATEGORY I, II, AND III PAROLEES AND THE VIETNAMESE TO BE A KEY ELEMENT IN ANY PROPOSAL TO PERSUADE THE RTG TO UNDERTAKE A RESETTLEMENT/DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

11. IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FACTORS WE WOULD ENVISION A RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM IN THAILAND EMBRACING INITIALLY AN ESTIMATED 60,000 REFUGEES, CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 15,000 LAO, 38,000 HMONG (MEO), AND 9,000 KHMER. IT SEEMS TO US THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE LAO AND KHMERS COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY RESETTLED IN NORTHEAST THAILAND WHERE THEY HAVE SOLID CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC TIES WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE. WHILE RESETTLEMENT SITES FOR SOME OF THE HMONG (MEO) COULD POSSIBLY BE FOUND IN THE NORTHEAST, THE BULK OF THEM WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE LOCATED IN THE NORTH OR NORTHCENTRAL SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY. REGARDLESS WHERE THE HMONG (MEO) ARE RESETTLED, THEY WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO MODIFY THEIR STYLE OF AGRICULTURE TO ACCOMMODATE RTG ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS. THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES SHOULD BE RESETTLED IN THE U.S., FRANCE, AND OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES.

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SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /086 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3356

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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12. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A SUCCESSFUL RESETTLEMENT/DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE PROBLEMS OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF NEW REFUGEES THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE ATTRACTED BY SUCH A PROGRAM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOTE THAT GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THAILAND'S COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT REFUGEES ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO SEEK REFUGE IN THIS COUNTRY WHETHER THERE IS A RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM OR NOT. DURING THE PAST YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, AN ESTIMATED 20,000 REFUGEES FLED TO THAILAND WITH NO REALISTIC HOPE OF RESETTLEMENT HERE OR ABROAD. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBERS OF NEW REFUGEES ATTRACTED PRIMARILY BY THE CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESETTLEMENT SCHEME WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT ADD-ON TO THE NUMBERS OF THOSE COMING TO
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THIS COUNTRY REGARDLESS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR RESETTLEMENT.

13. FURTHER, THE ONLY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO AN IN-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT PLAN IS A CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT CARE AND MAINTENANCE EFFORT WHICH DOES NOT REALLY ADDRESS THE LONG TERM REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND WHICH COULD HAVE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. IT IS ALSO AN ALTERNATIVE THAT MAY NOT BE FUNDABLE MUCH LONGER AS INTEREST AMONG FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IS THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING INFUX OF REFUGEES IN THAILAND THAT, WITH SEASONAL VARIATIONS, SEEMS CERTAIN TO CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, I.E., 3-5 YEARS. THE PROBLEM IS NOT GOING

TO DISAPPEAR. RATHER THE PROSPECTS ARE THAT IT WILL
 WORSEN. A COMPREHENSIVE RESETTLEMENT/DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
 DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, IS THE
 ONLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO HELPING THAILAND SHOULDER
 THE TAHNKLESS BURDEN OF BEING SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MAIN
 REFUGEE HAVEN.

14. THE FOLLOWING IS THE EMBASSY'S ESTIMATE OF REFUGEES
 PRESENTLY IN THAILAND WHO APPEAR TO QUALIFY FOR
 PAROLE TO THE U.S. UNDER THE CRITERIA USED DURING THE
 EXPANDED PAROLE PROGRAM FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES:

	CAT IA	CAT IB	CAT II	CAT III	TOTAL
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LAO	500	1,500	1,325	1,500	4,825
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HMONG	1,400	4,600	200	800	7,000
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HKHMER					
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NON-BOAT	100	200	25	250	575
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KHMER					
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BOAT	2	8	0	25	35
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VIET					
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NON-BOAT	80	120	75	100	375
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VIET					
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BOAT	150	250	20	125	545
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THAI DAM	10	50	15	25	100
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TOTAL	2,242	6,728	1,660	2,825	13,455
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WHITEHOUSE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, REFUGEE CAMPS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BANGKO13346
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770218-1074
Format: TEL
From: BANGKOK
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770643/aaaablftu.tel
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a370827a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 BANGKOK 9846, 77 BANGKOK 13225, 77 STATE 133673
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2105414
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INDOCHINESE REFUGEES - RESETTLEMENT IN THAILAND
TAGS: SREF, TH, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
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